Ecologies of Preferences with Envy As An Antidote to Risk Aversion in Bargaining by Nittai Bergman & Yaacov Z Bergman
Ecologies of Preferences with Envy as an






This version: November 2000
Models have been put forward recently that seem to be successful in explaining
apparently anomalous experimental results in the Ultimatum Game, where responders
reject positive offers. While imparting fixed preference orders to fully rational agents,
these models depart from traditional models by assuming preferences that take account
not only of the material payoff to oneself, but also of that which is given to others.
However, they leave open the question of how is an agent’s economic survival helped
by a preference order that advises him to leave money on the table. Our answer is
that, indeed, doing so does not help. But that the same envious preference order that
ill advises in some circumstances to reject an “insultingly” small offer, advises well
in other circumstances, when it helps the same agent to overcome his risk-aversion
and to offer a risky, tough offer that yields him a higher expected dollar gain. We
show the existence of population distributions where the two effects exactly balance
out across different preference types. These distributions are asymptotically stable,
stationary, and inefficient, in which different preferences are represented, and where,
as commonly observed in an Ultimatum Game, positive offers are made, of which
some are rejected with positive probability. Our theory yields new testable hypotheses.
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1    Introduction and Summary
It is by now well documented that in experiments of the Ultimatum Game,
1 subjects
do not behave as predicted by standard game theory, when it assumes that players are
selfish who care only for their own monetary gains. Instead of the predicted zero
offer, subjects consistently offer positive amounts, sometimes as large as 50% of the
divided surplus. And instead of the predicted agreement to take anything offered,
responders often reject offers as large as 30%. See the surveys by Güth (1995), by
Roth (1995), and by Thaler (1988).
This fundamental empirical departure from the predictions of the theory has stim-
ulated attempts to reconcile the theory with the data. One avenue to this end is part of
the literature on evolutionary learning. See the books by Fudenberg and Levine (1998),
by Samuelson (1998), and by Young (1998), the review by Mailath (1998), and
1
1 In the Ultimatum Game, two players have to agree on how to divide an amount of wealth.
One player, designated the offerer, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer on how to divide the amount. The
other player, the responder, either agrees, in which case the amount is divided accordingly, or he
rejects the offer, in which case the whole amount is lost to both.
Binmore and Samuelson (1995). This literature asks if and how players learn to play aNash equilibrium, and if they do, which one of the oftentimes many possible equilibria
do they play. This approach typically imposes a form of bounded rationality on the
players, making it vulnerable to the concern that its agents are implausibly naive. In
the Ultimatum Game context, this concern is the difficulty to imagine that responders
do not understand that 3 dollars are better than none (Mailath, op. cit.).
A competing approach to the explanation of the Ultimatum Game laboratory findings
maintains the classical economic assumption of stable, well defined preference orders
that agents strictly follow, but departs from the common assumption of selfishness,
assuming instead—based on mounting experimental evidence (see Roth op. cit.) or
even introspection—preference orders that take account not only of the material gain
to oneself, but also of that which goes to others with whom one is in an economic or
social interaction. Bolton and Ockenfels (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Levine
(1997), and Rabin (1993) employ such preferences in their explanation of the exper-
imental results of the Ultimatum and related games. In effect, their answer to the
puzzle, why people leave money on the table, is: people do that, because they prefer
the outcome whereupon both they and their economic contender get nothing to the
outcome where they get unacceptably less than the contender.
While this may well be true, it naturally begs the question, how do preferences that
compel an economic agent to leave money on the table help him to survive in a
competitive economic environment? In particular, a central hypothesis in economic
theory is that firms maximize own value,
2 which is based on the rationale that firms
that do not do so, are driven to extinction by competitive market forces. But a firm
that rejects a joint project, for instance, because the negotiating partner insists on a
large share of the project NPV, does not seem to maximize value.
3 Do such “hotheaded”
4
2
2 ‘Value maximization’ generalizes ‘profit maximization’ in a dynamic setting with uncertainty.
3 The common notion is that the Ultimatum Game captures salient aspects of large scale
business negotiation. Indeed, breakdown of negotiations over mutually beneficial prospects is a common
economic experience. Even if negotiations eventually resume, some value is irrecoverably lost. Note-
worthy business negotiations in which ultimatums were made that were rejected generating significant
value destruction involved the making of the film Heaven’s Gate (Bach, 1984), the battle for Eastern
Airlines (Bernstein, 1990), and the air traffic controllers’ strike (Shostack and Skocik, 1986).
4 For example, Deal and Kennedy (1982) identify different types of corporate cultures.
Among them is the Macho/Tough-guy which thrives on high risks, intense pressure, and quick feedback.
firms necessarily become extinct? Our purpose in this paper is to answer this question.Our answer, in the negative, is based mainly on the rigidities inherent in the mental
process that translates the emotion
5 of envy
6—or any other emotion, for that matter—to
decision making. It may best be understood by drawing an analogy to another emotion;
that of disgust. In How the Mind Works,
Pinker (1997) writes (p. 378), “Disgust is
a universal human emotion. Like all the
emotions, disgust has profound effects on
human affairs. During World War II, Amer-
ican pilots in the Pacific went hungry rather
than eat the toads and bugs they had been
taught were perfectly safe. [R]eassurance
by authority or by one’s own beliefs do
not disconnect an emotional response.” Dis-
gust implies a preference order over poten-
tial foods which in most scenarios enhances survival by preventing a person from
making mistakes of eating harmful materials. In some contexts, however, the same
disgust-induced preference diminishes survival when it generates mistakes; rejecting
what can be eaten, as in the case of the American pilots. What makes disgust an
adaptation, though, is that on average it enhances survival. As Dawkins (1981) puts
it, “However well adapted an animal may be to environmental conditions, those
conditions must be regarded as a statistical average. It will usually be impossible to
cater for every conceivable contingency of detail, and any given animal will therefore
3
5 The following is a testimony to the importance of emotions in business by one of its
chieftains: “Business people are not just managers; they are also human. They have emotions, and a lot
of their emotions are tied up in the identity and well being of their business.” From Only the Paranoid
Survive by Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of the Board of Intel Corporation.
6 The Oxford English Dictionary defines envy as “a feeling of discontent and resentment
aroused by and in conjunction with desire for another's advantages or possessions. Can be appeased
either by becoming better off than the other or by making the other worse off then oneself.” Parrott
(1991) emphasizes the acuteness of this emotion: “At the heart of envy is social comparison. When
one’s abilities, achievements, or possessions compare poorly with those of another, there is the potential
of decrease in one’s self-esteem and public stature.” See Heider (1958), Silver and Sabini (1978), and
Salovey and Rothman (1991). (Reduction in self esteem felt by a responder acceding to a small offer in
an ultimatum game may stem from his perception of having been subjugated by the offerer. This
element may be considerably muted when the offer is generated by a randomizing device, resulting in
an increased readiness to accept such offers, as found in experiments.) In the economic literature, some
authors use the terms disadvantageous inequality aversion or fairness seeking instead of envy. We use
the last term because it names an emotion, rather than the former two that connote contemplation.
frequently be observed to make ‘mistakes,’ mistakes that can easily be fatal.”
Business people are not just
managers; they are also
human. They have emotions,
and a lot of their emotions
are tied up in the identity
and well being of their
business.
—Andrew  S. Grove
Chairman of the Board
 Intel CorporationSimilarly, we argue, the emotion of envy, like that of disgust, generates a preference
order that prevents an economic agent from making mistakes in some economic
situations, at the expense of making mistakes in others. Specifically, an envious
preference order that ill advises an agent to
reject a positive size offer, advises wisely
when it helps the same agent to overcome
his risk-aversion
7 and offer a risky, tough
offer to a responder, about whose preference
and rejection threshold (the smallest offer
the responder would still take) the offerer
has only incomplete information. The tough,
risky offer then yields the offerer a larger
expected dollar gain than would be the case
had he been less envious and therefore had
offered a generous, less risky offer.
8, 9
The perfect adaptation would, indeed, have been to engage or disengage an emotional
response upon the demands of the circumstances. Engage disgust when food is abundant,
turn on envy when playing the offerer; but disengage disgust when food is scarce,
turn off envy when playing the responder. However, there are constraints on perfection
10
as Dawkins, op. cit., writes in a chapter bearing this title, “It is particularly in behavior
4
7 In more general settings than the current, risk aversion has an economic fitness advantage
over risk-neutrality and risk-seeking in that the former preference would more likely avert a gambler’s
ruin than would the latter two; see Merton and Samuleson (1974). But to keep this paper manageable,
we chose not to include these effects in the current model. Instead, we take risk-aversion of agents as
exogenously given. In a separate paper, we endogenize risk-aversion in a model where agents choose
from a menu of risky projects.
8 We adopt, in effect, a basic premise of evolutionary biology that, as Low (2000) states,
“No organism, including humans, has evolved to be aware of ultimate selective effects, but only of
proximate cues.” The evolutionary mechanism is mediated through preferences for proximate cues,
and those preferences that enhance ultimate survival will spread in the population. This proximate-ultimate
principle was first used by Güth and Yaari (1992) to analyze ecologies of preferences. They called it
the “indirect approach,” a term often used in subsequent economic literature.
9 Without reading much into the following result, it is straightforward to show that a Nash
bargaining solution would give a risk averse agent more of the pie the greater is the envy that his utility
exhibits. So, in the axiomatic bargaining theory too, envy serves as an antidote to risk aversion.
10 Maynard Smith (1978) writes: “If there were no constraints on what is possible, the best
phenotype would live forever, would be impregnable to predators, would lay eggs at an infinite rate,
and so on.”
that such mistakes are seen. The more static attributes of an animal, its anatomical
An envious preference
order that ill advises an
agent to reject a positive
size offer, advises wisely
when it helps the same
agent to overcome his risk-
aversion and offer a risky,
tough offer.structure for instance, are obviously adapted only to long term average conditions. An
individual is either big or small, it cannot change size from minute to minute as the
need arises.” Similarly, emotions, per definition, are states of mind that are characterized
by inflexibility.
11 Paraphrasing Dawkins, an economic agent is either envious or not,
he cannot adjust his feelings of envy and alter his attendant preference order with the
role he happens to be playing.
12 In fact, this is the position taken by classical economic
theory when it assumes, for instance, that a given individual is committed to the same
Bernoulli utility function, maintaining the same risk attitudes in different situations;
when playing the agent, say, in a principal-agent problem, or when choosing an
optimal portfolio of assets for his personal account.
A population in our model comprises firms. This makes the setting more concrete.
In particular, it lets us specify the mechanism by which preferences are transmitted in
a population. ‘Firms’ should be understood metaphorically, though, to stand also for
other kinds of organizations, like labor unions or HMOs, that when economically
successful, tend to increase in size by drawing in more members. Under a less precise
specification of the preference transmittal mechanism (eg, economically successful
preferences are imitated) which is common in the literature on preference evolution,
the analysis applies also to individuals.
The population of firms is partitioned into disjoint classes. Each class, or type, is
5
11 Hirschleifer (1987) and Frank (1988) argue that the inflexibility of emotions makes them
effective commitment devices. Since we do not introduce reputation effects in our model, the commitment
value of emotions does not play a role in it either. Nevertheless, both in the ‘emotions as commitments’
model, and in ours, the benefits of emotions are seen in the long run, or on average.
12 Why a sudden change in body size is infeasible in most animal species (some fish species
are capable of that) is a physiological question. Similarly, what makes emotions inflexible belongs to
the brain sciences. We simply posit that evident inflexibility.
13 We adopt Lazear’s (1995) view that “corporate culture acts as an alternative to using the
price system with costly monitoring as a motivator. It often is manifested as an attempt to change tastes
in the direction desired by the firm instead of compensating workers to take actions to which they are
averse. The establishment of a culture generally requires an initial investment that instills a particular
set of values in its workers so that they behave in the desired fashion as a natural consequence of utility
maximization.” See also Shleifer and Summers (1988). [For example, the Wall Street Journal (October
12, 1999) attributes the reason that “the Pentagon is often slow to pursue promising weapons” to its
organizational culture of “risk-aversion, impatience, and intolerance of failure.”] In our model, firms
are the carriers of their steady corporate culture from one period to the next. Stinchcombe (1965, 1979)
states that firms and other forms of organizations tend to be imprinted by their environmental conditions
at founding. He finds that industries formed in previous centuries still reflect today the character of
their formative period. According to Ott (1989), corporate culture is maintained by screening of new
members, socialization of new and old members, removal of members that deviate, and reinforcement
of members behavior in a desired direction. This notwithstanding, corporate culture is probably not
characterized by a corporate culture which is encapsulated in a preference order
13 heldby those acting on a firm’s behalf, over monetary gains to the firm and to its potential
business partners. The firms are periodically and randomly matched pairwise intra-
and inter-classes to negotiate on how to divide positive NPVs from joint ventures
using the Ultimatum Game protocol. Each firm accumulates its share of the gains
from those projects that are eventually
adopted. This setting is in the spirit of the
model of pairwise matched decentralized
trade as a foundation for competitive equi-
librium; see Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990).
The wealth accumulated by all firms in
a given preference class, divided by the
aggregate wealth accumulated by all firms
in all classes, is the fraction of total wealth
that is controlled by the given preference
order. The population distribution in our
model is the vector of fractions of wealth under the control of the different preference
orders. The analysis of the dynamics of these population distributions is the focus of
our paper.
Our main finding is that under plausible conditions, among them that all agents are
risk averse, there exists a class of population distributions of different types of envy
and risk aversion that are stationary, stable, and inefficient (value dissipating). In
these populations, as commonly observed in an Ultimatum Game, positive offers are
made, of which some are rejected with positive probability.
14 In these populations,
each type performs—in expected dollars—worse than other types on some occasions,
and better than other types on other occasions. As described above, the more envious
makes the mistake of leaving money on the table when responding to a tough offer,
6
capable of molding a “new man.” Instead, preferences instilled by corporate culture are patterned on
preferences already represented in human populations.
14 In a recent paper, Huck and Oechssler (1999) provide an evolutionary explanation for
behavior in the Ultimatum Game which is very different from ours. Their explanation rests on the
restrictive assumptions that economic interaction is carried out in a very small group of participants,
and that each member of the group plays against all others. In their model, the advantage of spiteful
relative to accommodating behavior stems from the fact that while the accommodating type is paired
with all spiteful types, the spiteful type is spared being paired with himself.





In these populations, as
commonly observed in an
Ultimatum Game, positive
offers are made, of which
some are rejected with
positive probability.him larger expected gains. On the other hand, the less envious performs better when
he tends to accept those offers that the more envious rejects, but his lower envy lets
his risk-aversion get the better of him, and he makes too generous offers that bring
him smaller expected dollar gains than those which a tougher offer would have
brought him. In these stable, stationary populations, the better and the worse perfor-
mances of each type average out to the same inclusive dollar fitness across all types.
Our theory predicts, then, that in those stationary populations distributions, the
same agents who tend to make tough offers will also tend to reject such offers, and
those who make generous offers will also tend to accede to tough offers. On average,
though, there is no monetary advantage to being either a tough or an accommodating
type. Interestingly, these two predictions, seem to be consistent with recent ultimatum
game experimental results by Eckel and Grossman (2000) who find that the tough and
the accommodating types divide along gender lines. They report (i) that “women
proposers make more generous offers than men[.] Among responders, women are
more likely to accept an offer of a given amount” and (ii) that the average monetary
earnings to women and to men are within 5% of each other (their footnote 22).
Another prediction of our model is that controlling for the level of envy (because
envy counteracts risk-aversion), and facing the same distribution of responders, the
more risk averse—calibrated independently of the Ultimatum Game—will tend to
make more generous offers.
We demonstrate three additional classes of stationary population distributions. One
class comprises distributions with a sufficiently large proportion of the most envious
type. In these efficient, weakly stable distributions all types prefer to appease the
numerous, most envious type by always offering his rejection threshold. Then all
types also agree to accept that offer, and they all get the same expected dollar gain,
both as offerers and as responders. A second class is a singleton comprising the least
envious type monomorphic population distribution. It is efficient and asymptotically
stable; its immediate neighborhood serving as its basin of attraction. A sufficient
condition for its existence is that the least envious type would not be non-envious. If
the least envious is non-envious, then the third class obtains comprising a continuum
of population distributions with sufficiently high proportions of the non-envious. In
these inefficient, weakly stable distributions all types offer zero, and only the non-
7
envious agree to take the offer.Interestingly, the last class implies that the non-envious, seemingly “more rational”
types would never take over an envious, seemingly “less rational”
15 population—ir-
respective of risk attitudes. The reason is that as the proportion of the non-envious
increases in the population, the whole popula-
tion—envious and non-envious alike—recogniz-
ing the increased chance of being paired with
non-envious types who accept any offer, move
to take advantage of the latter by lowering their
offers gradually (they still risk being paired with
another envious) until everyone optimally makes
zero offers which are accepted only by the non-
envious. But agreeing to accept zero, does not help an accommodating non-envious
responder. Both the non-envious and the envious perform equally well then, and the
population distribution comes to a rest with the envious still present.
Therefore, paradoxically, it necessarily takes some measure of envy for a preference
to be able to take over a population – if it does so at all. We show that if those with
the least, yet positive, measure of envy comprise a large enough percentage of the
population, they will take over. The reason is that then all types offer the positive
rejection threshold of the numerous least envious, in which case the latter have an
advantage as the only responders who agree to take those positive offers. (As offerers,
all types perform equally then.) In a sense, although no reputation effects are present,
the sheer number of the least envious type, and the fact that all of them reject offers
up to a positive threshold, act like a collusion to force everyone to offer a positive
offer, from which only the least envious benefit.
Although consistent with our argument, it is important to emphasize that we do not
rely on an evolutionary psychological argument of hysteresis by which adaptations
selected for in primeval times still manifest their time lagged effects in modern
8
15 The adjectives emotional and rational are commonly used as antonyms. It is in this sense
that we use the latter here.
16 Evidence against primeval origins of other-regarding preference comes form a team of
anthropologists headed by R. Boyd and J. Henrich from UCLA, who have recently conducted Ultimatum
Game experiments in primitive societies. Subject offerers made rather low offers, and subject responders
accepted all such offers.




envy for a preference
to be able to take over
a population.we argue that envious preferences are represented in modern business populations
because they are adaptations in those modern ecologies
17 of preferences.
* * *
The paper proceeds from the more general to the particular. In the next section, we
present the model. We analyze polymorphic populations comprising several type
classes in Section 3. A more detailed analysis of dimorphic populations is in Section
4, where we demonstrate the existence of asymptotically stable, stationary, inefficient,
dimorphic population distributions. The central role of risk-aversion in generating
these population distributions is examined in section 5. In Section 6 we demonstrate
numerically and diagrammatically the existence of these distributions in the trimorphic
case, indicating their existence in yet higher dimensions. To show that our model is
consistent with experimental results, we calibrate it to experimental data in section 7.
We conclude in section 8.
2     The Model
Consider an economy populated by a very large number of firms (the Law of Large
Numbers applies). Each firm comprises decentralized, identical profit centers or firm
divisions, and every division is headed by a manager.
18
Wealth accumulates in the economy in the following manner. At the beginning of
each period, total firm earnings from the previous period are plowed back into the
firm
19 and are distributed equally to firm divisions; w units of perishable capital to
each (w is constant across firms and throughout time, and is normalized to less than
9
17 The American Heritage Dictionary defines ecology as “the relationship between organisms
and their environment.” In our context, an ecology would mean the set of agents and their preferences;
the economic environment in which they operate, namely, the type of interactions and the population
distribution; and the ensuing dynamics of these distributions.
18 To simplify the exposition, we posit the multidivisional structure of firms where business
level strategies and all operating decisions are made at the divisional level, and the relationships with
the corporate headquarters are limited to corporate planning, budgeting, and the provision of common
services (Grant, 1998).
19 We employ the Modigliani-Miller proposition about dividend policy irrelevance. That
capital can be transferred from one period to the next through production only is assumed for counting
capital in each period more conveniently.
half a unit). Then divisions from different firms are randomly matched in pairs acrossfirm boundaries to consider identical joint ventures that require as input the w units of
capital under the control of each of the matched firm divisions.
Each pair of managers—heading their respective paired divisions—then negotiate
how to divide the return form the potential joint venture (normalized to one unit of
capital) using an Ultimatum Game procedure. With probability 0.5, one manager
assumes the role of the offerer, offering to give x units of wealth to the responding
manager, leaving 1 - x for the division under the offerer’s control. If the responding
manager accepts the offer, a contract is signed, and the joint venture is adopted, so
that at the end of the period each division receives its contracted allocation. If, on the
other hand, the responding manager rejects the offer, then the joint venture is aban-
doned,
20 and the input capital under each manager’s control perishes. At the end of
the period, which is also the beginning of the next, the returns from all the firm
divisions are pooled; the firm reorganizes into new divisions whose number equals
total firm earnings divided by w, the amount allocated to each new division; and the
process repeats.
A division manager, having risen through the ranks of the firm, would have assim-
ilated and internalized its corporate culture, which, in our context, means having
adopted a preference order—common to all managers in his firm—as modus operandi
when acting on behalf of his firm (see footnote 13 above). It is assumed that when
manager i is negotiating with a matched manager j, the former is guided by a
preference order over pairs (Mi, Mj) ∈ ￿￿ +, where Mi is the allocation of wealth to his
own division, and Mj is the allocation to the matched division.
21 It is further assumed
that the preference order adopted by all the managers of a firm can be represented by
a vNM expected utility over lotteries of such pairs with a continuous Bernoulli utility
function ui(Mi, Mj). Thus, the firms are partitioned into preference classes, or types,
indexed by a set I; all firms of type i ∈ I have all their division managers operate
with the same Bernoulli utility ui(Mi, Mj).
All utility functions are normalized to have ui(0, 0) = 0, and ui(1, 0) = 1. We will
10
20 In the U.S. auto parts industry, 126 companies entered into joint ventures with Japanese
parts suppliers in order to supply the U.S. plants of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. Conflicting objectives,
divergent management styles, and disputes over quality and labor practices resulted in wide spread
failure (Grant,1998; and Business Week, July 24, 1989).
21 This is a reduced form of the preference. When n parties interact, the objects of choice are
the n-tuples of monetary payoffs.
assume that ui(x, 1-x) increases in x. This means that managers are not altruistic;they always prefer that matched divisions transfer wealth to their own divisions (see
below). This also implies that if the graph of ui(x, 1-x) intersects the x axis, it does
so only once – from below. Formally, for any ui there is a corresponding xi ∈ [0, 1]
such that {x: ui(x, 1-x) < 0} = [0, xi). This assumption implies a very simple
strategy for the manager who responds to an offer that allocates to him x units of
wealth. He rejects all offers x smaller than xi, and accepts any offer equal to or larger
than xi, which will be called the rejection threshold.
We will focus on three broad classes of preference characteristics. One is character-
ized by u(Mi, Mj) ≤< u(Mi, Mj ′) for all Mi whenever Mj ≤> Mj ′. An increase in the
wealth of the contending manager—holding one’s own constant—decreases own utility,
which will be interpreted as envy. This type of preference implies a positive rejection
threshold xi—because u(0, 1) ≤< u(0, 0) = 0 and u is continuous—meaning that the
responder rejects positive offers smaller than xi, preferring that both he and his
contender get nothing to a split that gives him a positive amount, but also “too much”
to his contender. In fact, it will be convenient to use xi as a measure of envy, and we
will say, as a matter of speech, that preference i is more envious than preference j if
xi > xj.
The second preference type is characterized by u(Mi, Mj) ≤= u(Mi, Mj ′) for all
Mi and all Mj, Mj  ′.  These are the selfish, who do not care about how much the
contender will have.
The third preferences type is the benevolent which is characterized by u(Mi, Mj)
≤> u(Mi, Mj ′) for all Mi whenever Mj ≤> Mj′. The benevolent mildly rejoices in the
good fortunes of his partner, but not as much as he does in his own [u(x, 1-x) still
increase in x]. By definition, both the benevolent and the selfish set their rejection
thresholds to zero. The selfish type is a special case of the benevolent, therefore it
will be convenient to designate the set of both types as non-envious. Agents in our
model could also be allowed to exhibit different characteristics at different wealth
levels—envy at low and benevolence at higher levels—without changing our results.
But, for simplicity, we will keep the aforementioned classification.
Our analysis aims at demonstrating the existence of ecologies of preferences that
reflect economic behavior that is observed in real bargaining situations. To that end,
we confine attention to a limited set of preferences that, as modelers, we believe are
11
reasonably good approximations of real preferences. This is the reason, for example,that we a priori exclude non-expected utilities; not because those preferences cannot
comprise plausible preference ecologies.
We also exclude preferences that exhibit severe forms of advantageous inequality
aversion which have been used by Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) and by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) to explain experimental results of Ultimatum and other games. Operating
with such a preference, an agent who is to receive a large share of wealth relative to
another agent, prefers to grant part of it to the latter. This is a form of true altruism, to
be distinguished from reciprocal altruism which is generated by selfish preferences.
The reason that we do not include true altruistic preferences of this kind (recall that
we do allow benevolence, which is a milder form of advantageous inequality aversion)
is that while they may underlie laboratory findings of small monetary stake experiments,
being sensitive to framing and to written instructions (Bolton, Katok, and Zwick,
1998) and possibly also to the impact of experimenter observation (Hoffman, McCabe,
Shachat, and Smith, 1994), they do not seem to be descriptive of real-world, large
scale economic interactions. For example, consumers do not partially refund consumer
surplus to competitive producers (think of life-saving antibiotics); university adminis-
trators do not ask donors for permission to share windfall donations
22 with other
universities; and firms winning large contracts do not offer part of the surplus they
12
22 Sizable donations by wealthy individuals are sometimes cited as manifestation of true
altruism; Bill Gates being a favorite example. But the same person is also identified with Microsoft
about which US District Judge Thomas P. Jackson ruled in April 2000 that it violated federal antitrust
law through a series of acts meant to crush competition in protection of its monopoly in operating
system software for personal computers (Boston Globe, May 25, 2000). This, and other examples,
demonstrate that people can behave markedly differently inside and outside of business contexts. It is
the former context that we are interested in. Also, sizable donations are likely to be the (legitimate)
purchase of the goods, prestige and esteem, which are hardly achievable by deferring to a bargaining
opponent.
23 Recently, a small sample experiment was conducted by Eric Allman, creator of Sendmail,
a program that powers 75 percent of all e-mail servers on the Internet. It was not meant to be one, but it
could be interpreted as a large monetary stake dictator game experiment. From the Boston Globe
(April 24, 2000): “Until recently, Allman never made a dime from Sendmail. But after years of giving
free support to Sendmail users, many of whom were Fortune 500 companies, Allman decided to scrape
enough money together to give himself a salary and hire a couple of engineers. Hat in hand, Allman
asked half a dozen large companies to donate $50,000 each. Nearly all refused.” To our query, the
reporter, Alex Pham, emailed a reply, “Five companies refused outright and one equivocated. In effect,
no commitments.” Eric Allman estimated to us the value these six firms received from him over the
years in the millions of dollars.
A hypothetical argument that framing is responsible for the dissolution of altruism in the three
examples in the text, in Sendmail’s case, as well as in other extra-laboratory conditions, should be able
to explain why altruism can survive the more conflictive aura that usually pervades a real-world
bargaining situation.
won (evidenced by increased share prices) to their competitors who lost those contracts.
23Consistent with this is Camerer and Hogarth’s (1999) statement that “when incentives
are low, subjects say they would be more risk-preferring and generous than they
actually are when incentives are increased.”
24
On the other hand, we include risk aversion (in Section 5) as a fundamental
preference characteristic, because of its central role in explaining economic phenomena
in general, and behavior in bargaining situations with incomplete information, in
particular (see Murnighan, Roth, and Schoumaker, 1988).
For ease of notation, if the non-envious types are represented in the population of
managers, then they will be indexed by {-L, -L + 1, ..., 0} with 0 ﬂ L. On the other
hand, the envious—those with positive rejection thresholds—will be labled by {1, ...,
I} and will be ordered by increasing rejection thresholds. Thus, 0 = x-L = x-L+1 =
... = x0 < x1 ≤ﬂ ... ﬂ xI. By convention, we will denote xI+1 := 1, and x0 := 0 even
when no zero rejection thresholds are represented in the population.
The players, proposing and responding managers alike, do not know the preference
type of the matched players. They know only the distribution of such preferences in
the population. We are then looking for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
ultimatum game. Actually, the informational requirement necessary for this equilibrium
is much less demanding. It is sufficient to require that the offerer know only the
distribution of rejection thresholds in the population; only those bear upon the optimal
offers. By contrast, the equilibrium response, as already discussed, does not depend
on the population distribution. It depends only on the responder’s own preference
order.
It will prove useful to denote the offerer’s utility of type i from offering x (out of
the unit surplus), conditioned on the responder’s agreement to take x, by Oi(x) :=
ui(1 - x, x), and to denote by Ri(x) := ui(x, 1 - x), the type i responder’s utility
from responding affirmatively to an offer x.
25 Let p
t denote the population distribution
of preference types at time t, with components p i
t denoting the fraction of type i ∈ I.
To emphasize dependence of certain quantities on the population distribution p
t and
to distinguish those from quantities that do not so depend, the former will be superscribed
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24 As Rideley (1998, p.145) notes, “The more other people practice altruism, the better for us,
but the more we and our kin pursue self-interest, the better for us. [ ] Also, the more we posture in
favor of altruism, the better for us.”
25 Recall that we assume that Ri(x) increases in x, and, therefore, Oi(x) decreases in x.
by t in the sequel. Define the function F
t: [0, 1] → [0, 1] by F




=- Ê  ifx ∈ [xk, xk+1), (k = 0, ..., I). When an offerer of type i offers x ∈ [xk, xk+1), (k = 0,
..., I), his offer is accepted by all types j ∈ {-L, ..., 0, ..., k} and is rejected by all the
rest. Therefore, the probability that an offer x is accepted at time t is F
t(x). The
expected utility of type i from offering x at time t is then F
t(x)Oi(x).
The tradeoff in choosing the optimal offer is that increasing the offer x naturally
decreases the offerer’s share and with it decreases Oi(x). Simultaneously, though, an
increased offer x also increases F
t(x), the offerer’s chances to solicit a positive
response at time t. Note, however, that F
t(x) stays level between one rejection threshold
and the next, jumping upwards at rejection thresholds only. Therefore, the optimal
offer must be at one of the rejection thresholds. Denote then the expected utility of a
type i manager from offering an amount equal to a rejection threshold xj by Ui
t(j) :=
F
t(xj)Oi(xj); i ∈ {-L, ..., I}, j ∈ {0, ..., I}. To maximize his expected utility, type i,
operating at time t, selects the integer m
t(i) := min{argmax j ∈ {0, ..., I} Ui
t(j)}, and
optimally offers xmt(i) (the “min” breaks possible ties between different optimal offers).
In response, types -L, ..., m
t(i) agree to take that offer, because their respective
rejection thresholds are smaller than or equal to the offered xmt(i), while the rest reject
it.
Thus, each type i is assigned a pair of strategies; an offer xmt(i) and a rejection
threshold xi. Together, all these pairs comprise the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the incomplete-information surplus-sharing ultimatum game played at time t.
The rejection threshold depends only on the type’s preference. The equilibrium
offer, on the other hand, depends both on the type’s preference and on his belief
about the population distribution. Therefore, as the population distribution changes,
so do the beliefs of the different types, who, in response, tend to change their offers—eg,
the larger grow the proportions of those with high rejection thresholds, the more
generous become the offers—which, in turn, would tend to change the allocation of
wealth among the bargaining types, which feeds back to the change of the population
distribution.
Consider a particular manager of type i operating at the beginning of period t.
With probability 0.5 he assumes an offerer’s role in the surplus-sharing ultimatum
game. As already mentioned, when this type i optimally offers xmt(i), an agreement
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response comes only from types -L, ..., m






() . Type i’s expected dollar gain as offerer is  then EDOi
t := (1 - xmt(i))







With probability 0.5 the type i manager assumes the role of a responder. With
probability pk
t, he is then matched with an offerer of type k who offers xmt(k), which
the responder accepts iff this offer exceeds his own rejection threshold xi, ie, iff
i ﬂ m
t(k). Type i’s expected dollar gain as responder is then EDRi
t :=




=− ∑ xmt(k)1 1 1 1i ﬂ mt(k), (where 1 1 1 1 is the indicator function). The inclusive expected




The fraction of total wealth under control of the type i preference evolves as
follows. At the beginning of period t, total wealth in the economy is Nt dollars, a very
large number, out of which pi
tNt dollars are under the control of type i managers, who
number pi
tNt/w (by assumption, recall, w dollars are allocated to each manager at the
beginning of each period). Indeed, both the fraction of type i managers and the
fraction of wealth under their control is then p i
t. At the end of period t, each type i
manager, having played the game described above, ends up with EDi
t  dollars in
expectation. Therefore, by the Law of Large Numbers, the number of dollars plowed
back at the end of period t by all the type i managers into their respective firms is
(pi
tNt/w)EDi
t. Hence, the fraction of total wealth controlled by the type i preference

















 ,    i ∈ I.
Denote by 〈ED
t〉 the denominator in the right hand side of the last equation, which
averages out the expected dollar gain across all types, when the distribution vector is
p
t. It is easy to see that pi




t    
¥
<  〈ED
t〉, respectively. If, at a given
distribution vector, the equality holds for all types, then that distribution vector is
stationary; it dose not change with time.
We will say that a population distribution is efficient if all equilibrium offers made
in that population are met by equilibrium assents. Otherwise, if some offers are
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rejected, we will call the distribution inefficient. In the sequel, for ease of notation, wewill occasionally drop the time superscript, writing, for example, p1 instead of p1
t for
the fraction of type 1.
Proposition 1   A population distribution is efficient, if and only if all types offer the
highest rejection threshold. An efficient distribution is also stationary.
Proof of Proposition 1. If every type offers the highest rejection threshold, then all
types agree to accept such offers, and the distribution is efficient. On the other hand,
if there is a type that offers less than the highest rejection threshold, then at least the
type that uses the highest rejection threshold as its equilibrium response strategy,
rejects that offer, which renders the distribution inefficient. Clearly, if every type
offers the highest rejection threshold, and, therefore, every type agrees to accept it,
then at any one date, all types get the same dollar amount in expectation, namely one
half. Therefore, the distribution is also stationary. ￿
3      Polymorphic Populations
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of polymorphic populations without
imposing restrictions on the utilities other than those of the previous section. At this
level of generality, we can characterize the dynamics in some specific neighborhoods
of the n-dimensional unit simplex,
where n is the number of types rep-
resented in the population.
The next proposition states that
population distributions with a suf-
ficiently large proportion of the most
envious type are efficient and
Lyapunov
26 stable, where all types
prefer to appease the numerous, most envious type by always offering his rejection
threshold. The proposition is depicted in Figure 1.
16
26 No local push away from the distribution.
1
p1
Figure 1. Proposition 2 depicted for
dimorphic populations. The proportion p
1
is  of the less envious. Perpendicular
arrows signify weakly stable distributions.
Q 0Proposition 2  Let {ui}i∈I be the preferences represented in the population, where I
= {i0, ..., I} with 1 ﬂ I, and where i0 = -L ﬂ 0 if non-envious (benevolent or
selfish) are represented, and i0 = 1, if they are not. Let the preferences satisfy 0 <
Oi(xI) for all i in I; let    Q := min￿Oi(xI)/Oi(xi0)￿i∈I; and let S(   Q) := ￿(pi 0 , ..., pI) ∈
∆
#I: pI ∈ [1 -    Q, 1]￿. Then every distribution in S(   Q) is efficient and stationary, and
every distribution in the interior of S(   Q) is also Lyapunov stable. Under these distri-
butions, all types offer the highest rejection threshold xI,  and all types agree to
accept it.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Next, Proposition 3 states that if the least envious are not non-envious (they employ
a positive rejection threshold), then when the proportion of those are sufficiently
large, they take over the population. This happens as follows. When the least envious
are represented in the population
in a sufficiently large proportion,
(larger than    Q1 which is defined in
the proposition), all types move to
take advantage of this least envious
type by offering his rejection
threshold, which is the smallest
used by any of the types. Therefore,
as offerers, all types get the same response—agreement from the least envious and
rejection from all the rest—and, therefore, the same expected dollar gain. As a responder,
however, the least envious is offered (for sure) his positive rejection threshold which
he agrees to take, while all the rest reject it and get zero for sure. The inclusive dollar
gain of the least envious is therefore larger than that of the other types. So this type
flourishes. This means that the least envious monomorphic population is asymptotically
27
stable and efficient. These dynamics are depicted in Figure 2.
Proposition 3  Let only envious types, {ui}i∈I, be represented in the population, where
17
27 Exhibiting a local pull towards the distribution.
28 All types are envious who reject zero offers.
I = {1, ..., I} with 2 ﬂ I,
28 and let    Q1 := max￿Oi(x2)/O i(x1)￿i∈I.
29 If    Q1 ﬂ 1, then the
Q1 1 0
Figure 2. Proposition 3 depicted for
dimorphic populations. The proportion p
1 is
of the less envious. The distribution p
1 = 1
is efficient and asymptotically stable.
Q1 1 0
p1monomorphic population distribution comprising only the type 1 managers (p1 = 1),
who offer and agree to accept the lowest rejection threshold x1, is stationary and
efficient. Moreover, if    Q1 < 1, then that monomorphic distribution is also asymptotically
stable, and the set  S(   Q1) := ￿(p1 , ..., pI)  ∈  ∆
I:     Q1 ﬂ p1￿, which contains the
monomorphic distribution, is contained in the basin of attraction of that distribution.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Proposition 3 notwithstanding, a monomorphic distribution is not always viable.
Suppose that p1 = 1, x1 > 0, but that O 1(x1) < 0. This is a rather severe case of envy,
in which the whole monomorphic population prefers to offer zero in equilibrium, and
the whole population rejects this offer, becoming extinct in just one period. On the
other hand, O1(x1) < 0 could exist in a polymorphic population. A necessary condition
for the latter is that other types exist in the population who find it optimal to offer x1
or more.
Note that if the proportion of the least envious is smaller than    Q1, then they do not
necessarily take over the population. Proposition 3 is silent about this, and the matter
is taken up in the next section, where it is shown that under some plausible conditions
the dynamics is trapped in the interior of the unit simplex.
Proposition 4, which is stated next, is similar to Proposition 3, except that the least
envious are non-envious, whose rejection threshold is zero (as opposed to the least
envious of Proposition 3, who use a
positive rejection threshold). The in-
tuition behind Proposition 4 is also
similar. When the non-envious are
represented in the population in a
sufficiently large proportion (larger
than    Q0 which is defined in the prop-
osition), then all types move to take
advantage of the non-envious by of-
fering zero. Therefore, as offerers, all types get the same response and the same
18
29 When the denominator is zero, define the ratio to be either plus or minus infinity depending
on the sign of the numerator. When both denominator and numerator are zero, define the ratio to be 1.
expected dollar gain. As responders, although the non-envious types agree to take the
Q0 1 0
p1
Figure 3. Proposition 4 depicted for
dimorphic populations. The proportion p1 is
of the non-envious. Perpendicular arrows
signify weakly stable distributions.offer, it is zero dollars that they take, which yields them no advantage over the other
types who also get zero by rejecting. The inclusive dollar gain is therefore the same
for all types and the population distribution is Lyapunov stationary and inefficient.
This dynamics is depicted in Figure 3 (compare to Figure 2).
It is noteworthy that the non-envious act ‘rationally’ in these stationary states; they
offer zero
30 and accept zero. But this behavior—acceding to zero offers—does not
impart to them any advantage over the envious ‘hotheads’ who also offer zero, but
reject such offers. Therefore, the non-envious ‘coolheads’ cannot take the population
over from the envious ‘hotheads.’ By contrast, Proposition 3 indicates that it takes
some positive envy measure for the least envious ‘tepidheads’ to be able to take over
the population. In a sense, the sheer number of the least envious type, and the fact that
all of them reject offers up to a positive threshold, act like a collusion to force
everyone to offer a positive offer, from which only the least envious benefit.
Although Propositions 3 and 4 seem to represent two distinct situations, the transition
between them is smooth. To see that, note that as their envy measure (rejection
threshold) is increased from zero in Proposition 4 to a very small level in Proposition
3, the least envious proceed to take over the population but at a very slow rate.
Because being of the only type who are ready to take the very small offer gives them
only a very small expected dollar advantage over the rest. This take-over rate increases
as the envy measure of the least envious increases, because they are offered and they
agree to take increasingly more dollars.
Proposition 4  Let {ui}i∈I be the preferences represented in the population, which
includes both non-envious and envious, ie, I = {-L, ..., I} with 0 ﬂ L and 1 ﬂ I.
Let    Q0 := max￿O i(x1)￿i∈I, where the positive x1 is the rejection threshold of the least
envious. Then    Q0 ∈ (0, 1), and every population distribution in the set S(   Q0) := ￿(p1 ,
..., pI) ∈ ∆
#I:    Q0 ﬂ       pj jL =- Ê
0 ￿ is stationary and inefficient. Under these distributions,
all types offer zero, and only the non-envious types agree to accept it. Every distribution
in the interior of S(   Q0) is also Lyapunov stable.
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30 The non-envious offer zero, because they too take advantage of their own type. When the
proportion of the non-envious is relatively small and, therefore, that of the envious is high, the
non-envious are likely to make positive offers.
Proof: In the Appendix.4     Dimorphic Populations
Proposition 4 above demonstrates stable, stationary, inefficient population distributions
in which the non-envious types are represented in high proportions, which emboldens
everyone to offer zero. But this, in general, is not consistent with observed behavior.
Therefore, we now turn to demonstrate stable, stationary, inefficient population distri-
butions in which positive offers are rejected with positive probability, and which do
not necessarily include non-envious types. This analysis will also facilitate the under-
standing of the dynamics in situations not covered by Propositions 1 to 4. For tractability,
we will focus on dimorphic populations with only two envious types; one characterized
by a Bernoulli utility u1 entailing a rejection threshold x1, and the other with u2 and
x2, with 0 < x1 < x2. (Recall, p1 is the population proportion of type 1, the less
envious, in a generic period t.)
Lemma 1  Let {u1, u2} be the two utility types represented in the population with
Oi(x) := ui(x, 1-x) decreasing  in  x  and with rejection thresholds xi that  solve
Oi(1 - x) = 0 (i = 1, 2,), and which satisfy 0 < x1 < x2 < 1 (both types are
envious). Denote
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The optimal offers of type i are characterized as follows. (i) q i < 0 iff Oi(x2) < 0 ﬂ
Oi(x1). Type i then optimally offers x1 in any population distribution (◊p1 ∈ [0, 1]). (ii)
0 ﬂ q i < 1 iff 0 ﬂ Oi(x2) < Oi(x1), whereupon in a population with p1 ∈ [0, qi), type i
offers x2, and in a population with p1 ∈ [qi, 1], type i offers x1. (iii) 1 < q i iff Oi(x2) <
Oi(x1) < 0. Type i then offers zero dollars in any population.
Proof: In the Appendix.
According to the lemma, when q i ∈ (0, 1), it demarcates the population proportion
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of the less envious at which type i switches his optimal offer (i = 1, 2,). For p1 lessthan qi, where the proportion of the less envious is relatively small, type i worries
about being matched with the more envious type, who can only be appeased by the
larger offer x2. Therefore, type i offers the sure-to-be-accepted x2 there. For p1 larger
than qi, where the proportion of the less envious is relatively large, type i worries less
about being matched with the more envious type. Type i then takes his chances and
offers the smaller, risky offer x1 in the hope of being matched with the less envious,
who agrees to take it. Therefore qi will be called type i’s offer-switch. Note, however,
that each type’s offer-switch is determined by the preferences of both types.
Proposition 5 is the main result in this section. It classifies the dynamics of a
dimorphic population distribution into five classes by the envy parameters of the two
types. In particular, it gives the conditions under which there is an asymptotically
stable, stationary, inefficient, dimorphic (ASSID) population distribution with both
types present, and where, resembling real life and experimental behavior, different
size offers are made, and tough offers are rejected with positive probability.
Proposition 5   Let the conditions of Lemma 1 hold. Denote q¨ := 1 - (x2 - x1),
and q¨¨ := 1 - x2. There are five possible configurations of q1 and q2, which are
classified as follows. If 0 < x1 < x2 < 
1/2 , then either (1) 0 ﬂ q2 < q1 ﬂ 1 or (2) 0 ﬂ
q1 ﬂ q2  ﬂ 1. If 
1/2 < x1 < x2 < 1, then  (3)  1 < q1 and  1 < q2. If 0 < x1 < 1 - x2 < 
1/2  <
x2 < 1 - x1 < 1, then (4) q2 < 0 ﬂ q1  < 1. Finally, if 0 < 1 - x2 < x1 ﬂ 
1/2  ﬂ 1 -
x1 < x2 < 1, then (5) q 1 < 0 < 1 < q2. Each of the five configurations determines the
dynamics of the population distribution as follows.
(1) In this configuration, p1
t  ∈ (q2, min(q¨, q1)) implies  p1
t+1 > p1
t,  and  p1
t  ∈
(max(q¨, q2), q1) implies p1
t+1 < p1
t.
31 When q¨ ∈ (q2, q1), then p1
t = q¨ implies p1
t+1 =
q¨ for all t, meaning that the distribu-
tion p1 = q¨ is an ASSID population
distribution with the interval (q1, q2)
serving as its basin of attraction. No
other distribution is stationary and in-
efficient. All the distributions with p1
∈ ￿0, q2￿ are stationary and efficient.
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31 When the right side of an interval is equal to or less than the left side, then the empty
interval is meant.







Figure 4. Configuration 1 depicted for the case
where q* falls inside (q2, q1). The distribution
with proportion p1 = q* is then ASSID.serve as the basin of attraction for the monomorphic distribution with p1 = 1, which
is asymptotically stable, stationary, and efficient. In the ASSID distribution, type 1
agents, the less envious, offer the conciliatory offer x2, but agree to take even the
tough offer x1. In contrast, type 2 agents, the more envious, offer the tough offer x1,
but reject it as responders, agreeing to take only the conciliatory offer. On average,
though, both types get the same dollar amounts.
(2) In this configuration, p1




(max(q¨¨, q1), q2) implies p1
t+1 > p1
t.
When q¨¨ ∈ (q1, q2), then p1
t = q¨¨
implies p1
t+1 = q¨¨ for all t, meaning
that the distribution p1 = q¨¨ is an
unstable, stationary distribution. All
the distributions with p1 ∈ ￿0, q1￿ are
stationary and efficient. All the distri-
butions with p1 ∈ ￿q2, 1￿ serve as the basin of attraction for the monomorphic distribution
with p1 = 1, which is asymptotically stable, stationary, and efficient.
(3) In this configuration, both types offer zero in order to get sure rejections. The
whole population dies out in just one period.
(4) To get the dynamics in this configuration, replace the string “q2” in the description
of Configuration 1 above by the string “zero”.
(5) In this configuration, the whole unit interval  [0, 1] serves as the basin of
attraction for the monomorphic distribution with p1 = 1, which is asymptotically
stable, stationary, and efficient.
If x1 = 0, then either 0 < x2 ﬂ 
1/2 , whereupon either Configuration 1 or 2 holds;
or 
1/2 < x2 < 1, in which case Configuration 4 holds. All the results pertaining to
these configurations still hold, except that—according to Proposition 4—all the pop-
ulation distributions p1 in the interval (max(q1, q2), 1] are stationary, stable, and
inefficient.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Figures 4 and 5 depict typical dynamics under Configuration 1 and 2, respectively,
using a vector field along the unit interval. For a tail of a vector at p1
t, its tip is at p1
t+1.
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Vertical arrows signify zero vectors, and therefore they represent stationary distributions.
0 1
p1
Figure 5. Configuration 2 depicted for the
case where q** falls inside (q1, q2).
q2 q1 q**Whether those distributions are also stable depends on the direction of the arrows in
the immediate neighborhood of the stationary point; outward – unstable, inward –
asymptotically stable, zero vectors in the neighborhood – Lyapunov stable.
When the ASSID distribution exists, the population proportion of type 1, the less
envious, is p1 = q¨ = 1 - (x2 - x1), which is determined solely by the respective
rejection thresholds of the two types, and not by any other aspects of the utility
functions that generate them. Also, the proportion of each type in the ASSID distribution
increases directly with the extent to which own rejection threshold, or degree of envy,
exceeds that of the other type.
Proposition 5 also predicts that in an ASSID distribution, the same agents who
tend to make tough offers will also tend to reject such offers, and those who make
generous offers will also tend to accede to tough offers. On average, though, because
the distribution is stationary, there is no monetary advantage to being either a tough
or an accommodating type. As noted in our Introduction, these two predictions seem
to be consistent with recent ultimatum game experimental results by Eckel and Grossman
(2000) who find that the tough and the accommodating types divide along gender
lines.
As discussed above, Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that it necessarily takes some
positive envy measure for the least envious to be able to take over the population.
Proposition 5 clarifies when even that positive envy measure does not help. If the
initial population distribution (its p1) is within the basin of attraction of an ASSID
distribution, then the least envious cannot take over the population. Instead, the pop-
ulation is trapped at the ASSID distribution.
5     The Role of Risk-Aversion
Of special interest is the ASSID distribution at p1 = q¨ under Configurations 1 and 4,
where the two types coexist; and where different size offers are made, and tough
offers are rejected with positive probability. Note, however, that we have not yet
explicitly demonstrated the existence of an ASSID population distribution. To do
that; to facilitate further analysis of these ecologies; and, in particular, to examine the
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interaction between envy and risk aversion that, as will be shown, gives rise to theseecologies, we will consider a class of utilities that allow a degree of separation
between envy and risk-aversion characteristics.
 To that end, consider utilities of the form ui(Mi, Mj) := fi(gi(Mi, Mj)), where
gi(Mi, Mj) := Mi - δiMj, δi ∈ (-1, ∞),
32 with f an increasing function. To maintain
our calibration of the utility, we set fi(0) = 0 and fi(1) = 1. For this functional form
of the utility, the rejection threshold and the measure of envy is xi =
max•δi/(1 + δi), 0￿ so that δi correlates well with the envy measure. Benevolence is
then represented by δi ∈ (-1, 0), selfishness by δi = 0, and envy by δi ∈ (0, ∞). Note
that δi is positive iff xi is, in which case xi = δi/(1 + δi). On these occasions, we will
use xi instead of δi to parametrize envy in the utility function.
Risk-aversion is modeled as usual by letting the Bernoulli utility ui be concave on
￿￿ +.
33 The assumed linearity of the function gi then makes the concavity of ui equivalent
to the concavity of fi. Similarly, risk-neutrality is modeled as usual by a linear ui,
which, in turn, is equivalent to the linearity of fi on ￿. As is shown next, this
characterization of attitudes towards risk of the envious or the benevolent by the
curvature of the function fi turns out to be consistent with expected behavior in the
Ultimatum Game. In particular, the next proposition is a comparative statics result
that demonstrates that for Configurations 1 and 4, which are the ones that can generate
an ASSID distribution, as a preference order changes from exhibiting risk-neutrality
to risk-aversion, maintaining the same measures of envy of both types and the same
population distribution, the optimal offer (weakly) increases. The proposition further
shows that a necessary condition for an ASSID distribution to exist is that the less
envious type be also risk-averse.
Recall that Oi(x) is the utility of type i when his offer of x is accepted. It is
straightforward to see that for the current specialization of the Bernoulli utility, Oi(x)
=       fx x x ii i ( ) /( ) 11 -- - () .
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32 Individuals sporting δi ∈ (-∞, -1] give away all their wealth whenever possible. The
Talmudic Wisdom of the Sages maintains that extreme altruism, “yours is yours, and mine is also
yours,” is the ideal virtue. Indeed, if everyone is somehow convinced to adopt δi ∈ (-∞, -1] and
therefore to practice the extreme altruistic virtue, it becomes a stationary state. Nevertheless, it is easily
invaded by mere non-envious with δi  ∈ (-1, 0], whereupon the extreme altruists are driven into
extinction. Therefore, δi ∈ (-∞, -1] is not economically interesting.
33 This means that a sure convex combination of two pairs (Mi, Mj) ∈ ￿￿ + is preferred by
agent i to a lottery having the same two pairs as prizes with probabilities that are equal to the weights











Configuration 1 Configuration 4 Config 5
x2
p1
Figure 6. Different configurations for different values of x2, holding
everything else constant. The vector field portraying the dynamics  inside the
region where Configuration 1 holds, is also shown (same as Figure 4). The
dot between the two arrow heads pointing towards each other represents an
ASSID distribution. Perpendicular arrows signify weakly stable distributions.










γ γ γ γ1
Figure 7. Effect of increase in the risk-parameter
of the less envious on Configuration 1.
24.5Proposition 6  Let the Bernoulli utilities of the two types  be characterized by the
functions f1, f2 with positive envy parameters x1, x2 with joint values that correspond
to Configurations 1 or 4. Consider two alternative functions for type i (= 1, 2), one




, respectively, and let ξ(p1; Oi)
denote the optimal offer of type i in a population distribution p1. Then
(a) For i = 1, 2: qi(x1, x2; Oi
neutral
) < qi(x1, x2; O i
averse





) for every p1 ∈ ￿0, 1￿.
(b) If type 1 is also risk-neutral, then an ASSID distribution cannot exist. Instead,
the interval ((q2)
+, 1] becomes the basin of attraction for the monomorphic distribution
at p1 = 1.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Figure 6 about here
Figure 6 is typical.
34 It demonstrates the existence of ecologies that exhibit an
ASSID distribution, as well as others which do not. To draw it, we further specialized
to a negative exponential Bernoulli utility by taking fi(y) := (1 - exp(-γiy))/
(1 - exp(-γi)), and we selected x1 = 0.1, and risk parameters γ1 = 3, γ2 = 2. The
graphs of q1, q2, and q¨ were then drawn as a function of x2. As x2 ascends from 0.1
to 1, the following configurations are encountered in that order: first, Configuration 1
with p1 = q¨ outside (q2, q1) and, therefore, no ASSID distribution; then Configuration
1 with an ASSID distribution at p1 = q¨ inside (q 2, q1); then Configuration 4 with an
ASSID distribution at q¨ inside (q2, q1); then Configuration 4 with q¨ outside (q 2, q1)
and, therefore, no ASSID distribution; last, Configuration 5. To get Configuration 2,
type 1 must be significantly less risk-averse than type 2, eg, γ1 = 0, and γ2 = 4. To
get Configuration 3, both x1 and x2 must be above 
1/2 .
Figure 7 about here
Intuition may be gained by examining Figure 7 which demonstrates the effect of
the change in γ1, the risk-parameter of type 1, on his offer-switch q1. Here, x1 = 0.15,
25
34 It can be cast as a proposition at a formal cost that exceeds the benefit.
x2 = 0.45, and γ2 = 3. At γ1 = 0, type 1 is risk-neutral. Consistent with part (a) ofProposition 6, q1 is below q¨, and although Configuration 1 is in effect, the ASSID
distribution does not exist. As γ1 rises from zero and type 1 becomes increasingly
more risk-averse, q1 also increases, extending the domain of distributions p1 in which
he offers the conciliatory, riskless offer x2 (riskless, because all agents of both types
agree to take it) and reducing the domain where he offers the tough, risky x1 offer
(risky, because agents of type 2 reject it). Since a change in the offer-switch qi inside
the unit interval has this effect, it is intuitively useful to think of it as a measure of
type i’s toughness as an offerer; the lower his offer-switch qi, the tougher he is.
Continuing to raise γ1; when it passes 1.5, q1 tops q¨, making p1 = q¨ an ASSID
distribution according to Proposition 5.
Now compare the offer-switches; q1 of type 1 and q2 of type 2. From γ1 = 0 up to
γ1 = 3, type 2’s risk parameter γ2 = 3 is larger than that of type 1. It may seem
surprising, then, that type 2, the more risk averse, displays a lower, tougher q2 than
the larger, conciliatory q1 of type 1. Indeed, based on his risk-aversion alone, type 2
would be expected to mimic type 1 and join him in making the conciliatory, riskless
offer x2. But he does not. Due to his higher measure of envy relative to that of type 1,
x2 > x1, type 2 finds it unacceptable to offer the larger x2, so he makes the tougher,
albeit risky offer x2, instead. It follows that the same quality of his preference order,
envy, which coaxes type 2 as a responder to leave money on the table and reject an x1
offer from another type 2, emboldens him to overcome his risk-averse reservations
and make the risky, tough x1 offer. Whether this behavior is to type 2’s (expected
dollar) advantage, depends on the population distribution, as explained next.
The ASSID distribution owes its existence to the fact that under Configurations 1
or 4, in a specific region of population distributions, type 2, the more envious and
seemingly “less rational,” gains overall more expected dollars than type 1, the less
envious and seemingly “more rational.” According to Proposition 5, under the said
configurations, when p1 is in the interval (q¨, q1), type 1 offers the more conciliatory,
riskless offer, x2, and type 2 offers the tough, risky, offer x1. As a responder under
these conditions, type 1 has a clear advantage. Unlike type 2, who “leaves money on
that table” in rejecting x1 (offered by another type 2), type 1 always agrees to accept
all the offers that he gets (x1 from type 2 and x2 from type 1).
35 However, type 2 has
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35 As responders, type 1 gets p1x2 + (1-p1)x1, while type 2 gets only p1x2. See the proof of
Proposition 5.
an advantage as an offerer. As described above, buoyed by his elevated degree ofenvy, type 2 overcomes his risk-aversion and offers the tough offer x1. Provided that
the proportion p1 of types 1 who accept his tough offer is large enough, specifically
p1 > q¨, type 2 gains an advantage that suffices to compensate him for leaving money
on the table as a responder and then some more, resulting in an inclusive expected
dollar advantage to type 2 over type 1.
36 Although the two types continue to make
their respective offers at population distributions p1 that are below q¨ (as long as q2 <
p1), there the probability that type 2’s tough offer will be accepted is rather low, and
type 1 gains more expected dollars than type 2. In between, at p1 = q¨, is the ASSID
distribution, where the inclusive expected dollar gains to both types equalize. A
lesson: the economic fitness of a risk-averse type may be helped by a moderate
37
measure of envy.
We can now also explain Part (b) of Proposition 6 that states that risk-neutrality of
type 1 destroys the ASSID distribution. Recall that it is necessary for the existence of
the ASSID distribution that type 1 offer the conciliatory offer x2, while type 2 offers
the tough x1 offer. But the only reason that type 1 offers the riskless x2 is his
risk-aversion which, unlike that of type 2, is not counterbalanced by an elevated
degree of envy. As his risk-aversion decreases, though, a point is reached—when his
decreasing offer-switch q1 just descends below q¨—where he is not reluctant any
more to take on the risk of offering the risky, tough offer x2. As type 1 does that,
joining type 2 in offering x2, the latter’s advantage as the sole offerer of the tough x2
disappears, and with it disappears the ASSID distribution.
The following point needs to be emphasized. At distributions inside the interval
(q2, q1), each type plays one role better than his counterpart in terms of dollar gain.
The less envious plays better the role of the responder, while the more envious plays
better the role of the offerer. Precisely at q¨, the advantage and the disadvantage in
the behaviors of each of the two types balance out to produce equal inclusive dollar
gains, and, therefore, the ASSID distribution. But why cannot one of the types, the
more envious, say, adopt the winning behavior in each role; behaving like the less
envious when cast in the responder’s role, and like the more envious when cast in the
offerer role? He will then gain more. The answer is already provided in the introduction.
27
36 As offerers, type 1 gets 1 - x2, while type 2 gets p1(1 - x1).
37 An extremely envious type offers zero in order to get a sure rejection. He then loses the
advantage as offerer, and the less envious takes over the population.
It is based on the inherent inflexibility of emotions like envy, as manifest in a stablep1
p2
Figure 8. The vector field portraying the dynamics  of a
population comprising three preference types. The curved
line is the locus of ASSID distributions. The dots
represent stationary distributions.
27.5preference order which is independent of the role in which an agent may be cast.
The analysis above yields the following empirical verifiable hypothesis. Facing the
same group of responders, holding similar beliefs about the distribution of envy in the
group, and controlling for the envy intensity of the offerers; the more risk averse will
tend to make more conciliatory offers than the less risk-averse.
6     Trimorphic Population ￿ Numerical Demonstration
The “Dimensionality Curse” kicks in when trying to extend the analysis of Section 5
to ecologies comprising more than two types; the number of configurations explodes.
But we conjecture that the intuitions gained in the analysis of dimorphic populations
should carry over to polymorphic populations as well. As a probe of this conjecture,
we computed numerically and then drew in Figure 8 the vector field describing the
population distribution dynamics for a three-type, envious, risk averse population. In
this figure, the envy parameters of the three types are δ = 0.05, 0.2, and 0.8, respectively,
and the risk parameter is the same γ = 2 for each. The right triangle drawn is the
projection of the three-dimensional simplex onto the p1–p2 plane. The points inside
the triangle represent stationary distributions. Each side of the triangle then represents
a dimorphic population comprising one pair of types out of the three. The dynamics
along the three sides conform to those described in Proposition 5. In particular, the
dynamics along the two right sides are those of Configuration 1, clearly showing
ASSID distributions. The vector field also demonstrates ASSID distributions extending
to the interior of the simplex (along the curved line drawn inside the right triangle).
Also clearly demonstrated, consistent with Proposition 2, is the set S(   Q) of stationary,
stable, efficient distributions surrounding the monomorphic population at p3 = 1 (at
the origin).
Figure 8 about here
28Figure 9. Predicted and observed offer frequencies
in the Roth et al USA experiment. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Statistics is D(30) = 0.16. Grays in the
predicted graph represent rejection frequencies.
USA Observed







































28.57    Consistency with Experimental Results
The Ultimatum Game was extensively studied experimentally. However, those exper-
iments were not designed to test our theory. For example, in the celebrated experiments
performed by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991), subjects were told
only the outcomes of the games in which they participated; not the sample wide
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outcomes. The experimenters’ intention was to let subjects learn how to play the
game; not to let them learn the true distribution of types or of rejection thresholds that
they were facing. Nevertheless, since our theory contains many parameters that were
not measured, it may not come as a surprise that it is not difficult to calibrate those
parameters to reproduce the experimental results.
Accordingly, for each of the four groups of subjects corresponding to the four
countries where the experiments were done, we hypothesized a population comprising
11 types with specialized utilities as in Proposition 6 above, all envious with rejection
thresholds equally spaced between 10% and 50% of the contested sum, and distributed
either uniformly or bell shaped. The risk parameters were taken to be equal for all the
types in the same country. Thus, many degrees of freedom were left unused, namely,
alternative distributions of types and variable risk parameters for the different envy
types. We then adjusted the risk parameter for each country so as to minimize the
Kolmogorv-Smirnov statistics that we used to test non-parametrically the closeness of
fit between the theoretical and the observed distributions in the last experimental
rounds.
Figure 9 about here
In each of the four cases we were able to calibrate the single risk parameter and to
choose one of the two alternative distributions so as to get a Kolmogorv-Smirnov
statistics that would not have rejected the hypothesis that the observed offers were
drawn from the predicted offer distribution at an acceptable level of significance. For
illustration, we provide in Figure 9 both the predicted and the observed offer distributions
for the USA experiment. A risk parameter of 2.5 and a uniform distribution of response
29
38 The distribution of types in the sample of about 30 student subjects may differ from that of
the population from which the former is drawn.
together with the number of subjects which was 30, produced a minimum Kolmogorv-Smirnov statistics of 0.16; a fairly good fit. The theoretical rates of rejection cor-
responding to each offer are superimposed as light bars at the bases of the dark offer
frequency bars. These also seem to be in qualitative agreement with the reported
rejection rates (not shown), although we did not attempt to fit those as well. Clear is
the regularity by which lower offers are rejected at higher frequencies.
It should be noted that although the utilities we posit in this paper are motivated
differently from those posited by Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) and by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), they do share common geometric features; concavity in own monetary
gain, in particular. While the concavity of the utilities we posit is rooted in agents’
risk-aversion, Bolton-Ockenfels’s and Fehr-Schmidt’s stem from agents’ altruism.
This similarity, however, explains why our utilities can also explain the same market
games as do Bolton-Ockenfels’s and Fehr-Schmidt’s utilities.
39 Our utilities do not
explain laboratory dictator game results, though. As already discussed in Section 2,
our utilities do not feature altruism, because altruism does not seem to be an important
factor in real-world business transactions, which were the concern of the current
paper.
8     Conclusions
Models have been put forward recently that seem to be successful in explaining
seemingly anomalous experimental results in the Ultimatum Game. While imparting
fixed preference orders to agents, they depart from traditional models by assuming
preference orders that take account not only of the material gain to oneself, but also of
that which is allocated to others. However, they leave open the question of how is an
agent’s economic survival helped by a preference order that advises him to reject
positive offers, which amounts to leaving money on the table.
Our answer is that, indeed, doing so does not help. But that the same envious
preference order that ill advises in some circumstances to reject an ‘insultingly’ small
offer, advises well in other circumstances, when it helps the same agent to overcome
his risk-aversion and to offer a risky, tough offer that yields him a better expected
30
39 The details were omitted from this paper after we became aware of Bolton-Ockenfels’s and
Fehr-Schmidt’s papers.
dollar gain.Our main finding is that under plausible conditions, among them that all agents are
risk averse, there exists a class of population distributions of different types of envy
and risk aversion that are stationary, stable, and inefficient. In these populations, as
commonly observed in an Ultimatum Game, positive offers are made, of which some
are rejected with positive probability. In these populations, measured in expected
dollar gains, each type performs worse than other types on some occasions, and better
than other types on other occasions. The more envious makes the mistake of leaving
money on the table when responding to a tough offer, but his envy helps him overcome
his risk-aversion and make a tough offer that brings him larger expected dollar gains.
On the other hand, the less envious performs better when he tends to accept those
offers that the more envious rejects, but his lower envy lets his risk-aversion get the
better of him, and he makes too generous offers that bring him smaller expected gains
than those which a tougher offer would have brought him. In these stable, stationary
populations, the better and the worse performances of each type average out to the
same inclusive dollar fitness across all types.
We also show that in order for a preference type to be able to take over a population,
it must exhibit a positive measure of envy. Our theory also describes other preference
31
ecologies and their population dynamics, and generates testable hypotheses.Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Since, for i∈I, Oi(x) decreases in x, and xi0 ﬂ xk ﬂ xI,
then 0 < Oi(xI) ﬂ Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(xi0) for k = 0, ..., I-1. Therefore, Oi(xI)/Oi(xi0) ∈ (0,
1] and Q ∈ (0, 1]. Let p ∈ S(   Q), then the Ith component of p satisfies pI ∈ [1 -    Q, 1]
, and therefore,       pj ji
k




1  = 1 - pI ﬂ    Q for k = i0, ..., I-1. Hence, the
non-negative expected utility of any type i∈I from offering xk (k = 0, ..., I-1)
under such a distribution is 
     
pj ji
k
= Ê () 0 Oi(xk) ﬂ    QO i(xk) ﬂ    QO i(xi0) ﬂ Oi(xI), where
the latter is the expected utility of type i from offering x I, which is agreed to by all
types when acting as responders. Therefore, for all types, offering xI dollars under a
distribution in S(   Q) dominates offering any other amount (including offering zero to
solicit a refusal). The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium under any distribution in
S(   Q) is then for type i to offer xI and use xi as its rejection threshold. Since all types
offer xI, which is the highest rejection threshold, then, by Proposition 1, the distribution
is both efficient and stationary.
Since S(   Q) is pathwise-connected, then any sufficiently small perturbation to a
distribution in the interior of S(   Q) leads to a distribution that is still in the interior,
which is, therefore, stationary. Hence, all distributions in the interior are stable (not
asymptotically, though). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose    Q1 ﬂ 1. Then for any i in I, Oi(x2)/O i(x1) ﬂ 1,
and, since Oi decreases and x1 ﬂ x2, then two configurations are possible; either (i) 0
ﬂ Oi(x2) ﬂ Oi(x1) or (ii) Oi(x2) < 0 ﬂ Oi(x1). Suppose that configuration (i) holds,
then necessarily 0 ﬂ    Q1. To select his optimal offer, type i compares his expected
utility from offering the different possible offers. Offering zero results in sure rejection,
and i gets zero expected utility. Offering x1 solicits agreement only from type 1
managers and gives i an expected utility of p 1Oi(x1) ø 0. Offering xk (k = 2, ..., I)
solicits agreements only from types 1 to k, which gives i an expected utility of
     
pj j
k
= Ê () 1 Oi(xk). There are two possibilities here; either (i1) 0 < Oi(xk) or (i2) Oi(xk) ﬂ
0. In the first subcase (i1), under any distribution from S(   Q1), the following chained
inequality, 0 < 
     
pj j
k
= Ê () 1 Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(x2) ﬂ    Q1Oi(x1) ﬂ p 1Oi(x1), implies that
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type i prefers to offer x1 to offering either xk or zero (ties are broken in favor ofoffering x1). In the second subcase (i2), under any distribution with 0 < p 1 , the
inequalities 
     
pj j
k
= Ê () 1 Oi(xk)  ﬂ 0 ﬂ p1O i(x1) again imply that i prefers to offer x1.
Suppose that configuration (ii) holds. Then, xk ﬂ x2 implies Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(x2) < 0 ﬂ
Oi(x1). Again, 
     
pj j
k
= Ê () 1 Oi(xk) < 0 ﬂ p1O i(x1) implies that i’s optimal offer is x1.
To recap, if    Q1 ﬂ 1, then, all types prefer to offer x1 dollars under any distribution
from S(   Q1) to offering any other amount. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is for any
type i to offer x1 and use xi as his rejection threshold, with the result that all types
reject the x1 offer, but for type 1, who agrees to accept it. Therefore, as offerers, all
types get the same dollar amount in expectation, namely, p1(1-x1). As responders,
however, type 1 gets x1 dollars for sure, while all the rest surely get zero dollars. If
   Q1 < 1, then distributions exist in S(   Q1) that are not the monomorphic distribution, p1
= 1. Under those distributions, at the end of every period, type 1 managers get more
dollars than the managers of any other type. Hence, p 1
t, the fraction of wealth under
type 1 managers’ control, increases to unity in time, while the fractions of wealth
under the control of any other type decrease to zero. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an i in I, and a k in {1, ..., I}. Suppose 0 ﬂ
Oi(xk).  Then under any distribution from S(   Q0) the expected utility of type i from
offering xk is 
     
pj jL
k
=- Ê () Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(xk) ﬂ Oi(x1) ﬂ    Q0 ﬂ      pj jL =- Ê
0 = 
     
pj jL =- Ê ()
0 Oi(0),
40
where the latter is the expected utility of type i from offering zero. Alternatively,
suppose that Oi(xk) < 0. Then again, 
     
pj jL
k
=- Ê () Oi(xk) < 0 < 
     
pj jL =- Ê ()
0 Oi(0). Therefore,
all types, including the non-envious, prefer to offer zero in equilibrium, but only the
non-envious agree to accept it. Hence, all types get       pj jL =- Ê
0 dollars in expectation as
offerers, and zero as responders. (The non-envious agree to accept zero, while all the
others reject and get zero as well.) Therefore, each type gets the same amount in
expectation, namely, 0.5      pj jL =- Ê
0 , so the distribution is stationary and inefficient (be-
cause the envious types reject the zero offers). Stability in the interior of S(   Q0) is
established as in Proposition 2. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected utility levels of type i from offering zero, x1, or
x2, are, respectively, zero, p1Oi(x1), and Oi(x1). Case (i) implies Oi(x2) < 0 ﬂ p1O i(x1).
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40 Recall, Oi(0) = ui(1, 0) = 1.
In case (ii), p1 ∈ [0, qi) implies 0 ﬂ p1O i(x1) < Oi(x2), and p1 ∈ [0, qi) implies 0 ﬂOi(x2) < p1Oi(x1). Case (iii) implies Oi(x2) < p1O i(x1) < 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5.  We will demonstrate that 0 < x1 < 1 - x2 < 
1/2  < x2 < 1
- x1 < 1 implies Configuration (4). The others are similarly proven. Since O 1(x) is
decreasing in x, then x1 < x2 < 1 - x1 implies O1(x1) > O1(x2) > O1(1 - x1) = 0,
which, by Lemma 1, implies 0 ﬂ q1 < 1. Similarly, O 2(x) is decreasing in x, then x1 <
1 - x2 < x2 implies O2(x1) > O2(1 - x2) = 0 > O2(x2), which, again by Lemma
1, implies q2 < 0.
The dynamics for Configuration (1), 0 ﬂ q2 < q1 ﬂ 1, will be demonstrated. The
other configurations are similarly treated. From Lemma 1, for p1 ∈ ￿0, q2] (proportion
of the more envious is large enough) both types offer the more conciliatory offer x2,
and both types agree to accept it. Therefore, the expected dollar gain is the same for
both types. Actually, this is a special case of Proposition 2. For p1 ∈ ￿q1, 1] (proportion
of the less envious is large enough) both types offer the same tough offer x1, which
implies that as offerers both get the same 1 - x1, but as responders, type 1 gets more,
since he accepts all the x1 offers, while type 2 rejects them all. So type 1, the less
envious, has the overall advantage and flourishes to dominate the population completely.
This is, actually, a special case of Proposition 3.
Again from Lemma 1, for p1 ∈ (q2, q1) type 1 offers the conciliatory x2 and type 2
offers the tough offer x1. As offerer, type 1 gets assents from both types to his
conciliatory offer, and gains EDO1 = 1 - x2. As responder, type 1 hears x2 from a
type 1 with probability p1 and x1 from a type 2 with probability (1 - p1). Type 1
agrees to take both offers and gains EDR1 = p1x2 + (1 - p1)x1. His total gain is
ED1(p1) = 0.5(1 - x2) + 0.5[p1x2 + (1 - p1)x1]. Type 2 offers x1, only type 1
assents, and type 2 gains EDO 2 = p1(1 - x1) as offerer. As responder, type 2 hears
similar offers to those that type 1 hears, but he agrees only to x2 coming form type 1
and gets EDR2 = p1x2. Type 2’s total gain is ED2(p1) = 0.5p1(1 - x1) + 0.5p1x2.
If q¨ = 1 - (x2 - x1) is inside (q2, q1), then the total gains of the two types are
equal at q¨, so p1 = q¨ is a stationary population distribution. At p1 larger than q¨,
ED1(p1) < ED2(p1), and the inequality is reversed at p1 smaller than q¨. Therefore,
q¨ is also asymptotically stable. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. It is easy to see that Oi is concave if and only if fi is; and,
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trivially, fi represents risk-neutrality, meaning fi(x) = x, iff Oi(x) = (1 - xi - x)/(1- xi). Only the i = 1 case is proved. The proof of i = 2 is similar.
(a) Concavity of O 1(x), which is denoted O 1
averse
(x) to signify this, implies that under
Configurations 1 and 4 (see Proposition 5), O 1
averse
(x1)/(1 - x1 - x1) < O 1
averse
(x2)/(1 -











(x1) = q1(x1, x2; O 1
averse
). Then, by Lemma 1, for any p1 ∈ ￿0, 1￿, the
optimal offer never decreases, as q1 increases within (-∞, 1].
(b) It is easy to see that q¨ - q1(x1, x2; O 1
neutral
) = 1 - (x2 - x1) - (1 - x1 - x2)/
(1 - x1 - x1) = 2x1(x2 - x1)/(1 - 2x1), which is positive under Configurations 1 and
4, which imply 0 < x1 < x2 < 1, and x1 < 1/2. But, by Proposition 5, this violates a
necessary condition for the existence of the ASSID distribution. ￿
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